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Abstract 
A single experiment is reported that investigated implicit learning using a conjunctive rule set 
applied to natural words. Participants memorized a training list consisting of words that were 
either rare-concrete and common-abstract or common-concrete and rare-abstract. At test, they 
were told of the rule set, but not told what it was. Instead, they were shown all four word 
types and asked to classify words as rule-consistent words or not. Participants classified the 
items above chance, but were unable to verbalize the rules, even when shown a list that 
included the categories that made up the conjunctive rule and asked to select them. Most 
participants identified familiarity as the reason for classifying the items as they did. An 
analysis of the materials demonstrated that conscious micro rules (i.e., chunk knowledge) 
could not have driven performance. We propose that such materials offer an alternative to 
artificial grammar for studies of implicit learning. 
Keywords 
Implicit learning; Subjective measures; Artificial grammar; Classification; Chunks 
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1. Introduction 
People can learn regularities in the world seemingly with no intention of doing so and 
without the ability to verbally describe those regularities, a phenomenon called implicit 
learning. By far the most common experimental paradigm used to investigate implicit 
learning is artificial grammar learning (AGL; e.g., Dienes & Scott, 2005; Higham, 1997a, 
1997b; Reber, 1967, 1969; see Pothos, 2007 for a review). In typical AGL experiments, 
participants first observe or attempt to memorize a set of letter strings (e.g., MVXRT) that 
conform to an underlying rule set (finite-state grammar). After this training phase, 
participants are informed that all the strings they were just exposed to conformed to a rule set, 
but they are not informed about its nature. Instead, they are shown new strings during a 
testing phase that either conform to the rule set (grammatical strings) or not (nongrammatical 
strings) and asked to classify them accordingly. Many studies have shown that participants 
can make this discrimination at above-chance levels, but post-experimental interviews 
indicate that they are unable to verbalize the rule set used during training. 
The mechanism(s) underlying AGL have been a subject of considerable debate. Reber 
(1967, 1969, 1989) has argued that learning occurs because participants abstract the 
underlying rule set and that this learning is not available to consciousness. Others have 
contested this assertion, suggesting instead that the learning that takes place is more 
superficial and/or more conscious in nature. For example, Johnstone and Shanks (2001) and 
Wright and Whittlesea (1998) argue that people do not distinguish grammatical from non-
grammatical stimuli, but perform in ways that are consistent with the demands of the task.  
Where these demands happen to coincide with grammaticality, participants perform above 
chance, but without unconsciously abstracting the underlying rule set.  Dulany, Carlson and 
Dewey (1984) argued that people learn simple conscious rules about permissible string 
fragments (chunks; e.g., bigrams or trigrams) within the strings. They demonstrated that 
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although participants could not verbalize the complete rule set, they could identify those parts 
of the strings that made them grammatical. Furthermore, simulated rule sets from the 
underlined parts of the strings were  enough  to  almost  perfectly  reconstruct  participants’  
classification performance. Similarly, Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) argued that AGL is 
driven by conscious knowledge of sub-sequences of letters in the grammatical strings. They 
compared performance of a group of participants trained on typical strings used in AGL 
experiments with a group who only saw valid bigrams in training and found that test 
performance between the two groups was equivalent. Furthermore, items that were 
nongrammatical due to non-permissible bigrams were easier to reject than items that were 
nongrammatical due to permissible bigrams in the wrong place. Their conclusion was that 
learning was entirely due to conscious bigram knowledge. 
Other researchers have also maintained that chunk knowledge is critical to AGL, but 
placed less emphasis on the acquired knowledge being conscious. For example, in Servan-
Schreiber  and  Anderson’s  (1990)  competitive  chunking  model,  it  is  assumed  that  chunks  are  
formed during training and are later used to judge test strings. Frequently occurring letter 
combinations allow for larger chunks to be formed, and if those larger chunks can be used to 
process test strings, larger familiarity values result. Because of the inherent structure of 
grammatical strings, larger chunks can be used to process them at test compared to 
nongrammatical strings, resulting in them having higher familiarity and more likely to be 
classified as grammatical. Other frameworks and models have been proposed to account for 
AGL that also fundamentally rely on superficial knowledge of chunks rather than rule 
abstraction (e.g., Dienes et al., 1991; Jamieson & Mewhort, 2009a; Knowlton & Squire, 
1994; Redington & Chater, 1996; although see Higham, 1997a).  
1.1 Conjunctive Rule Sets as an Alternative to Artificial Grammar Stimuli 
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The nature of AG stimuli is such that regularities in the letter positions are hard to 
avoid, and so explanations of classification performance in AGL experiments often rely on, 
or must account for, chunks. Historically, chunking has figured highly in cognitive 
psychology, with demonstrations of its importance dating at least as far back as Miller’s  
(1956) critical work on short-term memory and Chase  and  Simon’s  (1973)  classic  
experiments with chess players. However, in the context of AGL, chunk knowledge, and in 
particular conscious chunk knowledge, is typically seen as a nuisance variable. In short, if 
conscious chunk knowledge can account for all learning in AGL experiments, as researchers 
such as Dulany et al. (1984) have proposed, then there actually may be nothing implicit about 
so-called  “implicit  learning”.    This has resulted in attempts to either control chunks or else 
obscure their presence.  For example, Higham (1997a) controlled for chunks in AGL and 
demonstrated that above-chance performance still occurred and could be affected by factors 
that did not influence chunks, such as the pronouncibility of the strings.  Norman, Price and 
Jones (2011) obscured the nature of their artificial grammar strings by changing the font and 
color of the letters used across the test list, finding that even participants that claimed to be 
responding to these changes classified grammatical strings at above-chance accuracy.  Other 
attempts to sidestep the issue of chunks have involved using non-local rules in music (Kuhn 
& Dienes, 2005) and even Tang poetry (Jiang et al., 2012). In our view, new materials and 
paradigms of this nature will enable us to further investigate the wide-ranging questions 
about human learning raised by AGL experiments whilst sidestepping issues related to the 
form of the stimuli. 
In the current research, we abandoned AGL materials in favor of real English words 
incorporating a structure that is less likely to involve the influence of micro-rules. Higham 
and Brooks (1997; see also Higham, Bruno & Perfect, 2010) were the first to use a structure 
of this sort, so we will explain their methodology and results in some detail here. The training 
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list of their second experiment consisted of natural words that conformed to the conjunction 
of two word categories. One category denoted the lexical frequency the words (i.e., rare 
versus common) and the other category denoted the grammatical class of the word (i.e., noun 
versus verb). Two training lists were constructed using these materials. The first list consisted 
of 50% rare-nouns (e.g., hyacinth) and 50% common-verbs (e.g., destroy), whereas the 
second consisted of 50% common-nouns (e.g., carpet) and 50% rare-verbs (e.g., inculcate). 
At test, participants either rated test items as consistent or inconsistent with the training list 
structure (classification) or as presented earlier in the training list or not (recognition). In both 
cases, test items were words representing all four conjunctions (i.e., common-nouns, 
common-verbs, rare-nouns and rare-verbs) and some had been presented earlier in the 
training phase (old words). For half the participants who were trained with the first training 
list, rare-nouns and common-verbs were consistent with the training-list structure, whereas 
rare-verbs and common-nouns were inconsistent. However, the opposite was true for the 
other half of participants trained on the second training list. For each training list, the data 
were collapsed across the two different consistent conjunctions and the two different 
inconsistent conjunctions to yield three stimulus types: old, new-consistent (NC) and new-
inconsistent (NI). 
Higham and Brooks (1997) found that participants were sensitive to the structure; that 
is, compared to NI words, NC words were given a higher consistency rating in classification 
and a higher oldness rating in recognition (i.e., higher false alarm rate), a difference they 
dubbed the structural effect.  They also found that old words (which necessarily were 
consistent with the structure) were rated higher than NC stimuli, a difference they dubbed the 
episodic effect. However, not a single participant was able to verbalize the structure when 
asked about it in a post-experimental interview.  
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Higham  and  Brooks’  (1997)  design had a number of positive features for investigating 
implicit learning. First, because natural words were used instead of meaningless letter strings 
(as in typical AGL studies), the true nature of the training-list structure was made obscure 
(i.e., participants  were  “garden-pathed”).  Indeed,  the  post-experimental questionnaire 
revealed that several participants were led to the erroneous conclusion that the training-list 
structure was semantic in nature (e.g., all training-list items belonged to the same semantic 
category). Second, the design had the advantage that the identifiable categories used to 
generate the structure (i.e., lexical frequency and grammatical class) were orthogonal to that 
structure. For example, suppose that during the classification task, a participant remembered 
that several of the training-list items were rare and so rated rare test items to be consistent 
with the structure. Regardless of whether participants were exposed to the first or second 
training list, only half the rare test items were consistent with the structure, so merely 
responding to the rarity of the test items would reveal no structural effect. For the same 
reason, if there were particular bigrams or trigrams that occurred more frequently in one 
category versus another (e.g., the bigram ns occurred more frequently in rare words than 
common words), such knowledge would not be helpful in accurately classifying the test 
stimuli. Instead, knowledge of the category conjunctions was needed to produce a structural 
effect, which participants showed sensitivity to in their classification and recognition ratings, 
but which they could not verbalize. Such lack of verbalization suggests that any knowledge 
of the rule set was held implicitly. 
1.2 Experimental Overview 
Given that conjunctive rule sets using words have the potential to further our 
understanding of implicit learning without the confounding of conscious micro rules, the 
following  experiment  was  conducted  in  an  effort  to  extend  Higham  and  Brooks’  (1997)  
original research. The first aspect of the extension was to test whether the structural effect 
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occurs with a different conjunctive rule set. The training list in one condition of the current 
experiment consisted of common-concrete words (e.g., hotel) and rare-abstract words (e.g., 
tidal), whereas the second consisted of rare-concrete words (e.g., kite) and common-abstract 
words (e.g., written). Higham et al. (2010, Experiment 1) used these specific materials in an 
experiment on recognition memory and found higher false alarm rates for NC versus NI test 
items. However, the focus in the current research is on classification and whether or not the 
structure is available to consciousness, which Higham et al. did not address. Furthermore, we 
also include here an analysis of the frequency of chunks within the items, which, again, was 
missing  from  Higham  et  al.’s  research. 
A second extension was to test whether learning would be observed with a 2AFC task 
in which there was a choice between a NC and a NI word on each trial, without possible 
influences from old items. These changes were implemented partly to test the generality of 
learning across different task types (yes/no versus 2AFC), but also to determine if learning 
would occur in a paradigm more typical of those used in implicit learning research in which 
all test items were new. Additionally, the 2AFC task would eliminate any possible yes/no 
response bias that may have contaminated previous results. Higham and Brooks (1997) 
attempted to eliminate response bias contamination by computing the discrimination index A’  
(Grier, 1971) from signal detection theory. However, A’ has been shown to have undesirable 
threshold characteristics under certain circumstances, which means that response bias can still 
affect it (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The 2AFC design adopted in the current 
research circumvents these issues because yes/no response bias does not apply. 
However, perhaps the most important extension was that we examined the extent to 
which participants were aware of the rule set in more depth than in Higham and Brooks 
(1997).  Since  the  publication  of  Higham  and  Brooks’  experiments,  Dienes  and  Scott  (2005)  
introduced a distinction between structural knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the rule set itself) 
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and judgment knowledge (i.e., knowledge about whether individual stimuli conform to the 
rule set).  Both types of knowledge can be implicit or explicit. For instance, a person may 
have high confidence that an item is consistent with the rule set (explicit judgment 
knowledge) but not know why it is the case (implicit structural knowledge). To measure 
structural knowledge, we administered a more detailed post-experimental questionnaire than 
that originally used by Higham and Brooks. To measure judgment knowledge, confidence 
ratings were required at the time of each individual response (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & 
Goode, 1995). By using both a post-experimental questionnaire and confidence ratings, both 
the  state  of  participants’  judgment  knowledge  and  the  state  of  their  structural  knowledge 
could be investigated. 
2. Method 
2.1 Materials and Design 
Four categories of words were drawn from the MRC psycholinguistic database (see 
Wilson, 1988) – common-concrete words (e.g. hotel), rare-abstract words (e.g. tidal), rare-
concrete words (e.g. kite) and common-abstract words (e.g. written). Words were classified 
as either common (frequency of 80+ per million) or rare (frequency of 1 or less per million) 
by Kucera-Francis written-frequency norms (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  Each word was also 
classified as concrete (rating of 520 or more) or abstract by the MRC concreteness rating 
which merges data from several sources (e.g., Coltheart, 1981). Due to a shortage of words 
with a low concreteness rating in the database, abstract words were identified by the 
experimenter from the set of unrated words in the database. Two training lists were created 
by randomly selecting sets of 40 words from each of the four categories. Training List A 
consisted of 40 common-concrete words and 40 rare-abstract words, whereas Training List B 
consisted of 40 rare-concrete words and 40 common-abstract words. Words were therefore 
assigned to each training list based upon a conjunctive rule set, which combined two factors. 
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Each word on a training list could be rule consistent in one of two ways (i.e. common-
concrete or rare-abstract on Training List A and rare-concrete or common-abstract on 
Training List B). 
Words used during testing were all NC or NI. A set of 160 word pairs (e.g. hotel/kite) 
was created that consisted of 40 common-concrete/rare-concrete pairs, 40 common-
concrete/common-abstract pairs, 40 rare-abstract/common-abstract pairs and 40 rare-
abstract/rare-concrete pairs. With these pairings, one word in each pair was always a NC 
word and the other word in the pair was always a NI word regardless of the Training List 
participants were exposed to. Each type of rule violation (frequency or concreteness) was 
equally represented across pairs because the words in each word pair were always matched 
on either frequency or concreteness but not both (e.g., if both of the words in a pair were rare, 
then one word was abstract and the other was concrete). From the set of 160 word pairs, two 
test lists of 80 word pairs were compiled by randomly assigning 20 word pairs of each type to 
each list. 
 A questionnaire was also used to assess verbalizable knowledge of the rule set. The 
questionnaire consisted of six questions. The first four questions asked participants what they 
believed the rule set was, and if there were any rules they considered but rejected. The fifth 
question gave participants a list of possible categories that may have been included in the rule 
set and allowed them to select as many or as few as they liked, provided that they offered 
further detail for any selected category. The following categories were the options: word 
length, number of syllables in the words, grammatical class of the words (noun/verb/adverb), 
the  number  of  letters,  the  words’  meaning,  the  familiarity  of  the  words,  the  words’  lexical  
frequency  (e.g.  rare  or  common),  the  words’  association  to  other  words,  the  words’  likely  
position  in  a  sentence,  and  the  words’  concreteness  (e.g.  concrete  or  abstract).  The  final  
question directly informed the participant that the rule set was a conjunctive rule set 
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involving two of the categories, and asked what the participant thought the two categories 
were and how they were related. 
2.2 Procedure 
All participants signed consent forms before completing the experiment on an Apple 
Macintosh computer using a script implemented in Runtime Revolution. In the training 
phase, 33 participants were shown words in sets of eight from one of the two training lists 
and asked to rate each word for understanding on a scale of 1 (did not understand the 
meaning) to 4 (fully understood the meaning). Half of the participants were given Training 
List A and the other half were given Training List B, with presentation order being 
randomized separately for each participant. 
Following the training phase, all participants were given the first test phase. 
Participants were informed of the existence of the rule set but not what it was, following 
which they were given the word pairs one at a time and were asked to complete a 
classification task in which they had to choose the NC word in each pair. They were then 
asked to make a confidence judgment on a scale of 50-100 about their classification, with 50 
being described as a guess and 100 as complete certainty. All participants then completed a 
second test phase that was identical to the first, with the addition of an attribution question 
about whether the basis of their judgment was random chance, intuition, memory or rules. 
The test was self-paced – for each word all judgment prompts were present on screen 
simultaneously and participants initiated the next trial by clicking a button with the mouse.  
Participants were prevented from moving on to the next trial until all information had been 
entered. Assignment of test list to test phase was counterbalanced across participants.  
Presentation order of the word pairs at test was randomized anew for each participant. 
After the two tests phases, all participants completed the questionnaire as described 
above, with questions administered one at a time. 
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3. Results 
 In the interests of brevity, we collapsed the two test blocks except where analyzing 
the attribution data.  
3.1 Accuracy and Confidence 
Means for accuracy by training list, overall accuracy, accuracy for responses given 
50% confidence ratings, confidence for correct answers, and confidence for incorrect answers 
are presented in Table 1. Mean classification accuracy was higher than chance (50%), for List 
A, List B and for both lists combined, t(15) = 7.00, p < .001, d = 1.75; t(16) = 5.29, p < .001, 
d = 1.28; and t(32) = 8.29, p < .001, d =  1.10,  respectively.  Like  Higham  and  Brooks’  (1997)  
and  Higham  et  al.’s  (2010)  participants, our participants acquired sensitivity to the studied 
conjunctive rule. 
Mean confidence ratings for correct answers were compared to those for incorrect 
answers to examine the status of their judgment knowledge. Although the two means were 
very close, confidence for correct answers was significantly higher than that for incorrect 
answers, t(32) = 3.24, p = .003, d = .15, suggesting that judgment knowledge was explicit. 
3.2 Chunk Frequency 
To determine whether participants achieved above-chance classification accuracy on 
the basis of chunks, a chunk-strength analysis was conducted on the stimuli. First, the 
bigrams in each word for each training list were counted (e.g., the  word  “table”  has  four  
bigrams  in  it:  “ta”,  “ab”,  “bl”  and  “le”).  Each  test  stimulus  could  then  be expressed in terms 
of its average bigram chunk strength. For instance, suppose that across the training-list items, 
“ta”  had  occurred  20  times  in  the  training  list,  “al”  had  not  appeared  at  all,  and  “le”  had  
appeared 16 times.  With  these  frequencies,  the  test  word  “tale”  would  have  an  average  
bigram chunk strength of (20+0+16)/3 = 12.  This counting procedure was repeated for the 
trigrams in the stimuli. The mean of the bigram and trigram chunk strengths for each word 
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was also calculated, a measure we refer to as associative chunk strength. The mean chunk 
strengths for bigrams, trigrams and associative chunk strength are presented in Table 2. 
The bigram strengths were entered into a 2 x 2 between-subjects Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with training list (A versus B) and word type (NC versus NI) as between-subject 
factors. There were no significant main effects and no interactions, highest F < 1.  In fact, 
numerically the NI bigram strength was slightly higher than the NC bigram strength for each 
training list.  An analogous ANOVA on the trigram chunk strengths yielded an effect of rule 
set, F(1, 636) = 7.05, p = .008, η2 = .01, reflecting higher chunk strengths for Training List A 
than Training List B.  There were no other effects, highest F < 1. An ANOVA on associative 
chunk strength yielded no effects at all, highest F < 1. Crucially, there were no main effects 
of word type for bigrams, trigrams or associative chunk strength. Together, these analyses 
suggest that the above-chance accuracy observed with classification was not supported by an 
unexpected confound between chunk strength and the conjunctive rule used to construct the 
study and test materials. 
Although it would appear that responding to the overall chunk strength of the stimuli 
would not result in above-chance performance, it is possible that participants responded to the 
difference between the chunk strengths of each individual pair. If this were the case, then 
participants’  endorsement  rates  would  have  been  correlated  with  the  difference  in  chunk  
strength between the NC and NI words across trials.  For each participant, a point-biserial 
correlation between accuracy of response (correct or incorrect) and chunk strength 
differential (NC chunk strength – NI chunk strength) was computed.  The mean correlation 
coefficient across participants was then compared to zero. For bigrams the mean correlation 
(M = 0.02, SEM = 0.02) was no different from zero, t(32) = 1.13, p = .27. The same was true 
of trigrams (M = 0.01, SEM = 0.01), t(32) = .44, p = .66 and of associative chunk strength (M 
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= 0.03, SEM = 0.02), t(32) = 1.17, p = .25.  These analyses suggest that participants were not 
responding to the difference in chunk strength between NC and NI words. 
3.3 Basis of Judgment 
In Test Phase 2, participants attributed each decision to random chance, intuition, 
memory or rules. Mean accuracy, confidence and proportion of use for each attribution are 
presented in Table 3, with accuracy for each attribution type being proportion of correct 
classification responses that were assigned that attribution.   
Accuracies for the attribution types were entered into a one-way, repeated-measure 
ANOVA.  Only those participants who had used all four attributions were entered into the 
ANOVA.  Dienes and Scott (2005) found higher accuracy for memory and rules attributions 
than for guess and intuition attributions.  Here, there were no differences in accuracy by 
attribution at all, F(3, 51) = 1.11, p = .35.  Accuracies for intuition and memory were above 
chance, t(32) = 3.19, p = .003, d = 0.56 and t(23) = 2.28, p = .03, d = 0.46, respectively.  
However, for random chance and rules the accuracy failed to reach above-chance levels, 
highest t(32) = 1.88, p = .07.   
Confidence by attribution was also entered into a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA. There was a main effect of attribution, F(3, 51) = 26.22, p < .001, η2 = .61.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that random chance confidence ratings were smaller than 
intuition, memory and rules confidence ratings, F(1, 17) = 54.03, p < .001, η2 = .76, F(1, 17) 
= 32.79, p < .001, η2 = .70 and F(1, 17) = 44.56, p < .001, η2 = .72, respectively.  Intuition 
confidence ratings were smaller than memory and rules confidence ratings, F(1, 17) = 17.38, 
p = .001, η2 = .51 and F(1, 17) = 23.87, p < .001, η2 = .58.  Memory and rules confidence 
ratings were not different, F < 1. 
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3.4 Questionnaire Data 
Several measures were examined to see if any participant developed verbalizable 
knowledge of the rule set. Above-chance performance when participants claim to be guessing 
indicates non-verbalizable knowledge by the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995). The 
guessing criterion was tested in the same way as mean accuracy using accuracy for 50% 
confidence responses, with one participant removed who only made one 50% confidence 
response. Above-chance performance for 50% confidence responses was found, t(31) = 4.00, 
p < .001, d = 0.70. However, as can be seen in the analysis of attribution types, testing the 
guessing criterion using random chance attributions resulted in chance performance 
Similar to Higham and Brooks (1997), the questionnaire indicated that no participant 
developed verbalizable knowledge of the rule set. The penultimate question of the 
questionnaire invited participants to select as many potential rule categories as they liked 
from the list of length, number of syllables, category of word (noun/verb/adverb), letters, 
meaning, familiarity, frequency (e.g. rare or common), association to other words, likely 
position in a sentence, and concreteness (e.g. concrete or abstract). The number of 
participants that selected each category can be seen in Table 4. Critically, only 10 participants 
(30%) selected frequency and only two participants (6%) selected concreteness, the two 
categories that made up the conjunctive rule set. However, different participants selected each 
category. Thus, even when given several options and allowed to select more than two, no 
participant selected both relevant categories.   
In the final question, participants were directly told that the training words followed a 
conjunctive rule set and were asked to describe the rule set. Of the thirty-three participants, 
nineteen (58%) picked neither of the correct categories, thirteen (39%) selected one out of the 
two correct categories but incorrectly described its involvement, and one participant (3%) 
selected the correct two categories but failed to describe the link between them.  Thus, no 
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participant could verbalize the rule set even when directly told it was conjunction between 
two categories. 
4. Discussion. 
Consistent with Higham  and  Brooks  (1997),  participants’  classification  performance  
discriminated between NI and NC words at above-chance levels. Using identical materials to 
those used here, Higham et al. (2010) demonstrated that NC words had a higher false alarm 
rate than NI words in old/new recognition. However, ours is the first study to demonstrate a 
structural effect with these particular materials in classification. Furthermore, unlike both of 
Higham  and  colleagues’  previous  studies  on  word  category  conjunctions,  yes/no response 
bias could not have created this pattern of performance because a 2AFC rather yes/no design 
was employed. 
More importantly, there was good evidence that the structural effect observed in this 
research was implicit in nature. First, as explained in detail above, the design made it very 
unlikely that participants were merely responding to conscious rules about permissible 
bigrams and trigrams (e.g., Dulany et al, 1984) or other small sub-components of the literal 
stimuli. Higham (1997a) demonstrated that for pronounceable AG strings, participants relied 
less on chunk information and more on whole-item processing compared to unpronounceable 
AG strings, an effect that is likely to also hold for natural words used in our experiment.  The 
lack of word type effects in the chunk analysis further demonstrated that participants could 
not perform the task on the basis of bigram and/or trigram strength. In fact, in all four 
comparisons across chunk size (bigram, trigram or associative chunk strength) and Training 
List (A or B), the chunk strength of NI items was either matched with (one comparison) or 
numerically larger than (five comparisons) that of NC items (Table 2). Thus if participants 
had merely responded on the basis of chunk strength, overall there would have been a 
negative structural effect, which did not occur. Furthermore, the correlational analysis 
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demonstrated that participants did not use the difference in chunk strength between each item 
in a pair to select the items. Instead, to discriminate the NC and NI items, participants must 
have learned about the conjunction of concreteness and lexical frequency that composed the 
rule set. For this reason, materials of the sort used here are useful because the learning is 
unlikely to be based on conscious chunk knowledge.   
Further evidence that the observed learning was implicit was derived from the 
confidence ratings and in-depth questionnaire data, neither of which was available in 
previous conjunctive rule-learning studies. First, the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995) 
was met using one measure; participants performed above chance even when they claimed to 
be guessing (i.e., 50% confidence rating). If participants were conscious of the rule set then 
there would have been no need to guess, so the guessing-criterion result using 50% 
confidence ratings suggests that participants were using non-verbalizable knowledge to 
perform at least part of the classification task. In contrast, when using attributions of random 
chance the guessing criterion was not met.  However, performance was above chance for 
intuition attributions. Intuition is defined as knowing that you are correct, but not knowing 
why you are correct (Dienes & Scott, 2005). Thus the attribution data also supports the use of 
some non-verbalisable knowledge. Second, the in-depth questionnaire data indicated that not 
a single participant was able to successfully verbalize the rule set on the questionnaire. Even 
on the final question, for which participants were directly told that the rule was conjunctive, 
and given a list of candidate categories to choose from, no participant successfully verbalized 
the rule set. Instead, as in Higham and Brooks (1997), many participants identified semantic 
attributes of the training-list words as providing the basis of the rule set, attributes such as 
word meaning (52%), semantic category (48%), and word association (48%; see Table 4). 
Indeed, most participants failed to identify even one part of the rule set correctly (only 30% 
for lexical frequency and 2% for word concreteness), and none identified both. Despite this, 
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participants were able to classify stimuli at above-chance levels. This finding mirrors Higham 
and  Brooks’  (1997)  findings  despite  our  use  of  a  questionnaire  that  specifically  guided  
participants towards the correct answer.  
Although structural knowledge was implicit, judgment knowledge was not. That is, 
participants’  subjective  confidence  was  somewhat sensitive to the accuracy of their 
classification responses. Participants’  intuition  and  memory based performance was also 
above chance, both attributions being associated with explicit judgment knowledge. At first 
glance, explicit judgment knowledge may appear contradictory to the fact that participants 
could not verbalize the rule set. However, again the in-depth questionnaire provides an 
account of this finding. Sixty-one percent of participants identified familiarity as the basis of 
their classification decisions, the most frequently chosen category from the available list of 
choices. Similarly, Higham  et  al.’s  (2010)  participants  endorsed  NC  words  more  than  NI  
words  in  old/new  recognition  and  explicitly  attributed  their  “old”  judgments  to  familiarity on 
a metacognitive rating task. Familiarity has been implicated as contributing to performance in 
AGL tasks as well (e.g., Scott & Dienes, 2010; Tunney, 2007). In recognition memory 
research, familiarity is typically considered to be a vague, automatic process, but despite this, 
it gives rise to a very conscious feeling that a stimulus was previously encountered (e.g., 
Yonelinas, 2002). Thus, the explicit judgment knowledge that participants demonstrated 
likely arose from a conscious subjective feeling of familiarity, the source of which could not 
be identified. Familiarity could be reflected in both intuition and memory attributions. Thus, 
the  fact  that  the  source  of  that  familiarity  was  an  item’s  consistency  with  the  rule  set  meant  
that participants simultaneously possessed implicit structural knowledge and explicit 
judgment knowledge. 
In conclusion, we believe the current data coupled with those from Higham and 
Brooks (1997) and Higham et al. (2010) provide a strong case for using conjunctive rule sets 
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with natural words as stimuli in future implicit learning research. Robust structural effects 
were observed in all cases, and in no cases were participants able to verbalize the rule set 
even when presented in the current research with the categories making up the conjunction. 
Instead, responding was primarily attributed to vague feelings of familiarity. Critically, these 
effects could not have been caused by conscious knowledge of micro rules. Conjunctive-rule 
word materials are easy to construct, requiring only a pool of words that are selected for 
different attributes from resources readily available on the Internet. Consequently, 
conjunctive rule-sets instantiated in natural words offers a credible alternative route to 
investigate the questions raised by previous AGL experiments. The specific rule set used here 
is of additional interest because the underlying meaning of the words must be processed in 
order to learn the rule set, an aspect that is difficult to achieve with artificial stimuli. Using 
natural words as stimuli has the additional advantage that experimental results can potentially 
inform recognition memory research as well as implicit learning research. That such an 
endeavor  may  be  fruitful  is  evidenced  by  Higham  &  Brooks’  (1997)  discussion  of  mirror  
effects  and  in  Jamieson  and  Mewhort’s  (2009a,  2009b)  more  recent  attempts  to  account  for  
implicit-learning effects with recognition memory models (e.g., MINERVA2; Hintzman, 
1988).  The results presented here contribute to this on-going effort. 
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Table 1 
Mean Accuracy and Confidence in the 2AFC Classification Task. Standard Error of the 



























   M  59.78 55.55  57.31 55.80 60.30 59.17 
   SEM 1.31 1.05 0.88 1.45 1.37 1.30 
Tables
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Table 2 
Mean Bigram, Trigram and Associative Chunk Strength by Training List and Word Type.  
Standard Error of the Mean is Also Shown. 
Training list and word type Bigram  Trigram  Associative 
 M SEM  M SEM  M SEM 
Training list A         
NC 1.47 0.08  0.34 0.03  0.87 0.05 
NI 1.49 0.08  0.34 0.03  0.89 0.05 
Total 1.48 0.05  0.34 0.02  0.88 0.03 
Training list B         
NC 1.50 0.08  0.25 0.03  0.91 0.05 
NI 1.51 0.08  0.26 0.03  0.92 0.05 
Total 1.51 0.05  0.25 0.02  0.91 0.04 
Note. NC = New rule-consistent words, NI = New rule-inconsistent words. 
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Table 3 
Mean Accuracy, Confidence and Proportion of Use for Attribution Choices. Standard Error 









Random Chance  53.98 (2.12) 52.42 (0.79) 0.46 (0.04) 
Intuition 58.89 (2.78) 61.62 (1.24) 0.30 (0.03) 
Memory 62.40 (5.43) 72.97 (2.93) 0.09 (0.02) 
Rules 58.29 (4.51) 71.37 (2.39) 0.15 (0.03) 
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Table 4 
Mean Number and Mean Percentage of Participants Indicating that a Given Category was 
Used to Guide Classification (Maximum Possible of 33) 
 Measure 
   
   Category Type 
Mean Number of 
“Yes”  Responses 
Mean Percentage of 
“Yes”  Responses 
Word Length 7 21% 
Number of Syllables 2 6% 
Semantic Category 16 48% 
Number of Letters 6 18% 
Word Meaning 17 52% 
Word Familiarity 20 61% 
Lexical Frequency 10 30% 
Word Association 16 48% 
Word Position 0 0% 
Word Concreteness 2 6% 
 
 
